Constitutional Interpretation: Its roots

"It is essential to the being of the national government, that so erroneous a conception of the meaning of the word necessary should be exploded.

"It is certain, that neither the grammatical nor popular sense of the term requires that construction.  According to both, necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to.   It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government or person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing.

". . . To understand the word as the Secretary of State does, would be to depart from its obvious and popular sense, and to give it a restrictive operation, an idea never before entertained.  It would be to give it the same force as if the word absolutely or indispensably had been prefixed to it."

"Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States" Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 23 February 1791

This is the basis upon which purposeful Interpretation of The Constitution of the United States has been based. Something as simple as a word.

Hamilton was quite capable at putting words together, but not so capable that he could run all of them by endless generations of people without being found in error. His writings are masterful, but his reasoning fails when he steps away from simple truth and relies instead upon rationalizing and rhetoric.

The case with the word, necessary, very clearly illustrates this. In these passages, Hamilton is making his case against Jefferson's rigid reading of the text of the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause.

Hamilton uses a great many subjective adjectives in his supposedly reasonable and dispassionate explanation, meaning to diminish the reader's regard for the facts; "common mode", "obvious", and "popular" relegate this fulcrum expression to the office of "pebble in the shoe". Essentially, Hamilton is casting aspersions on not only the word used, but those who used the word in the first place.

His first two meanings for necessary – needful or requisite – are accurate in their summation of the definition and character of the word in question. The last three, however, are not: incidental implies happenstance without the fixed character of being indispensible; useful and conducive to merely imply convenience – not gravity.

Necessary, then, is far more than that which answers convenience or indifference. Rather, like air, necessary is that without which the condition which needs it cannot exist. Regardless of the common mode and popular usage, necessary has an absolute meaning that should not be discarded out of hand when it is not convenient.

Hamilton makes amply clear his contempt for the truth, and for those who deserve it at his hand, the most in his third paragraph. By resorting to the "obvious and popular" sense, he departs from the actual sense – regardless of how congruent they may be – and marks himself out as a politician and not a leader of men. By insisting on an enforcement of his position based on "common", "obvious and popular" perceptions – rather than dispassionate, logical truth – Hamilton reveals unmistakably his intent to sway the opinions of the masses for his own advantage.

One is tempted to believe that Washington was under some onus or duress with regards to Hamilton, explaining why it was Hamilton's unsatisfactory opinions that prevailed; to conclude that Washington was of a similar heart and mind to such a solicitor as Alexander Hamilton is the grossest insult to the memory of our first president and leader. Unfortunately, history's unfolding record of such exchanges is proving a disappointing lens through which to view our nation's heroes.